Tunnel vision effect, frog rule, flea effect: collaborative governance of marine pollution in the Mediterranean region

As the pollution issues in the Mediterranean Sea become increasingly prominent, it is necessary to implement collaborative governance. This paper introduces concepts from management and economics, such as the tunnel vision effect, the frog principle, and the flea effect, to analyze the impact of different effects or principles on the effectiveness of collaborative governance for Mediterranean pollution. The tunnel vision effect reminds us not to focus solely on short-term benefits but to pay attention to long-term sustainable development. The frog principle emphasizes the cumulative harm of pollution, urging all parties to take early action to prevent pollution from reaching irreversible levels. The flea effect points out the importance of setting reasonable goals and limits, using clear laws and regulations and incentive mechanisms to encourage active participation in pollution governance. The application of these management principles provides important theoretical guidance for the governance of marine pollution in the Mediterranean region. Research shows that when the increase in benefits from focusing on a specific goal or issue is small and the benefits obtained from governing marine pollution are also small, the marine pollution governance in developed countries is more consistent with the flea effect; otherwise, the marine pollution governance in developed countries is more consistent with the frog principle. When the increase in benefits from focusing on a specific goal or issue is large and the benefits obtained from governing marine pollution are small, the marine pollution governance in developed countries is more consistent with the frog principle; otherwise, the marine pollution governance in both developed and developing countries is more consistent with the tunnel vision effect. When the benefits obtained from governing marine pollution are small, the marine pollution governance in developing countries is more consistent with the flea effect. When the increase in benefits from focusing on a specific goal or issue is small and the benefits obtained from governing marine pollution are moderate, the marine pollution governance in developing countries is more consistent with the frog principle.